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Hong Kong
Preliminary Observations from a Spatial 
History Project 
 
K W O N G  C H I  M A N
Abstract : This article summarises the author’s recent experience of 
revisiting the Battle of Hong Kong in 1941 through a spatial history 
project based on a critical reading of primary sources from Hong Kong, 
the United Kingdom, Canada and Japan. The spatial history approach 
allows the author to propose new observations about the operational and 
tactical dimensions of the battle, the experi-ence of the Canadian forces, 
the performance of the Japanese forces and the reasons for the bat-
tle’s outcome, which was seemingly a foregone conclusion. This article 
also discusses some possi-ble future research directions on the topic and 
outlines how these new directions help with the commemoration of the 
battle in Canada, Hong Kong, Japan and the United Kingdom.
The baTTle of hong kong sit The 1941 Battle of Hong Kong (hereafter “the battle”)1 was a pivotal event in Hong Kong’s 
history; the battle witnessed a temporary end to the British rule 
of Hong Kong, which had just celebrated its centenary, and the 
beginning of the Japanese rule that brought humanitarian disaster. 
The war has been remembered in Hong Kong, China, the United 
Kingdom and Japan, for it changed the lives of all who experienced 
it. The event also impacted Canada, which sent its 1,975-man C 
1  The “Battle of/for Hong Kong” in this article only refers to the Japanese invasion 
of Hong Kong that took place between 8 and 25 December 1941. 
© Canadian Military History 2021
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2 Reappraising the Battle of Hong Kong
Force to Hong Kong in November 1941.2 The war brought trauma 
and suffering to the C Force members, who were not adequately 
compensated for decades after the war.3 While there has been much 
discussion concerning the dispatch of C Force to Hong Kong and 
the Allied Powers’ strategy in 1940–1941, there remain gaps in our 
understanding of the battle, such as the part played by the Canadian 
forces and their experience. Moreover, while few doubted that the 
outcome of the battle could have been otherwise, there is still room 
to discuss the plans of both sides, the factors leading to the British 
defeat and the performance of both forces. 
This article argues that reappraising the Battle of Hong Kong 
from a spatial history (SH) perspective allows us to better appreciate 
the cause of the British defeat/Japanese victory and the performance 
of the forces on both sides. It suggests that Japanese operational 
planning and control was poor and that the Canadian troops played 
an important role in several key engagements during the battle.4 
This article first reviews the major literature on the battle and then 
discusses the author’s SH project on the battle. Next, it turns to 
different aspects of the battle, such as the planning and interservice 
cooperation of both sides and the performance of the Canadian forces 
and their impact. It finally concludes by briefly discussing the factors 
leading to the outcome of the battle and areas for future research. 
the battle of hong kong: a review of literature
The Battle of Hong Kong was studied in detail even before the Pacific 
War ended. The first systematic studies of the battle were conducted 
by the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) units that invaded Hong Kong. 
Between December 1941 and March 1942, the 23rd Army, the 38th 
2  For the impact of the battle on Canada, see Galen Roger Perras, “Defeat Still Cries 
Aloud for Explanation: Explaining C Force’s Dispatch to Hong Kong,” Canadian 
Military Journal 11, 4 (2011): 37–47. 
3  For a detailed discussion of the compensation issue, see Stephen Winter, 
“Administrative Justice and Canada’s Hong Kong Veterans,” in Transitional Justice 
in Established Democracies: A Political Theory (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 
2014), 128–53. 
4  For the most updated narrative about the battle in English, see Kwong Chi Man 
and Tsoi Yiu Lun, Eastern Fortress: A Military History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press, 2014), 117–224; and Philip Cracknell, Battle for Hong 
Kong, December 1941 (Stroud: The Hill, 2019).
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Division and various independent units filed their war diaries to the 
Ministry of War, some of which included the perceived lessons from 
the battle. Many of these materials were later used by the National 
Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) to compile the official history of 
the Japanese armed forces during the Second World War, published 
in 1971.5 However, since then, there has been no dedicated Japanese 
work on the topic, although the NIDS used one engagement at Shing 
Mun Redoubt as a case study. During the 1960s, the Indian Armed 
Forces had published a history of the Indian forces during the Battle 
of Hong Kong, but it is difficult to obtain first-hand accounts from 
the Indian perspective.6 
Similarly, the British and Commonwealth garrison of Hong 
Kong, despite being incarcerated in prisoner of war camps, compiled 
multiple war diaries. Some of these, such as those kept by infantry 
battalions (as in the case of the 1st Middlesex), offered detailed 
accounts. The first postwar English account of the battle was Major 
General Christopher Maltby’s (the garrison commander) dispatch in 
the London Gazette, which formed the basis of the official History of 
the Second World War, compiled by Stanley Kirby and published in 
1957.7 In the 1960s and 1970s, more works appeared as people shared 
their war experiences. The more popular works about the battle at 
that time include Tim Carew’s The Fall of Hong Kong, John Luff’s 
Hidden Years and George Endacott’s Hong Kong Eclipse.8 Many who 
experienced the war contributed to these works; for example, John 
Luff interviewed General Maltby when writing his work. However, 
as archival materials were yet to be available, these works provided 
only the outlines of a very confusing battle. It was not until the 
1990s and 2000s that more systematic studies appeared; this period 
5  Honkon-Chosa Sakusen [Hong Kong-Changsha Operations] (Tokyo: Asagumo, 1971).
6  Combined Inter-services Historical Section, Official History of the Indian Armed 
Forces in the Second World War 1939-1945 (New Delhi: Orient Longmans, 1960). 
The author of this official history had consulted some of the Indian veterans who 
had fought in the battle, making this work invaluable in the study of the Indian 
experience during the battle. 
7  Stanley Kirby, The War Against Japan, Vol. 1 (London: H.M.S.O., 1957). The 
account, however, was very critical of Maltby and his staff for underestimating the 
Japanese and failing to prepare for a landward offensive. 
8  Tim Carew, Fall of Hong Kong (London: Anthony Blond, 1960); John Luff, The 
Hidden Years: Hong Kong, 1941–1945 (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post, 
1967); and George Endacott, Hong Kong Eclipse (Hong Kong: Oxford University 
Press, 1978).
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also witnessed the emergence of studies focusing on the Canadian 
experience.9 Some of these works, such as Tony Banham’s Not the 
Slightest Chance, Oliver Lindsay’s (a British Army historian) Lasting 
Honor and The Battle for Hong Kong, Philip Bruce’s Second to 
None and Philip Snow’s The Fall of Hong Kong, became standard 
references for the topic in the following decades.10
In the 2010s, works that combined English and Japanese first-
hand accounts and war diaries of the battle emerged, such as Exposed 
Outpost (Chinese), Old Soldiers Never Die (Chinese) and Eastern 
Fortress.11 These works deepen our understanding of the events from 
the Japanese perspective by returning to the war diaries of individual 
units and the Japanese informal regimental histories. More updated 
English accounts based on extensive research of archival materials 
and first-hand accounts also appeared, such as David Macri’s 
Clash of Empires in South China and Philip Cracknell’s Battle 
for Hong Kong.12 However, as even more Japanese war records and 
memoirs have emerged since the early 2010s, a chance to further our 
9  Carl Vincent, No Reason Why: the Canadian Hong Kong Tragedy: an Examination 
(Stittsville, Ontario: Canada’s Wings Inc., 1981); Brereton Greenhous, “C” Force to 
Hong Kong: a Canadian Catastrophe, 1941-1945 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997); 
Charles Roland, Long Night’s Journey into Day: Prisoners of War in Hong Kong and 
Japan, 1941-1945 (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2001); Terry 
Copp, “The Defence of Hong Kong December 1941,” Canadian Military History 10, 4 
(2001): 5–20; Nathan Greenfield, The Damned: the Canadians at the Battle of Hong 
Kong and the POW Experience, 1941–45 (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers, 2010); 
and Perras, “Defeat Still Cries Aloud for Explanation,” 37–47.
10  Oliver Lindsay, The Lasting Honour: The Fall of Hong Kong, 1941 (London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 1978); Phillip Bruce, Second to None: the Story of the Hong 
Kong Volunteers (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991); Tony Banham, Not 
the Slightest Chance: the Defence of Hong Kong, 1941 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 2003); Philip Snow, The Fall of Hong Kong: Britain, China and the 
Japanese Occupation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); and Oliver Lindsay, 
The Battle for Hong Kong 1941–1945: Hostage to Fortune (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 2005).
11  Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, Gudu qianshao: taipingyang zhanzheng zhong 
de xianggang zhanyi [Exposed Outpost: The Battle of Hong Kong in the Pacific 
War] (Hong Kong: Cosmos, 2013); Kwong Chi Man, Laobing busi: xianggang huazhi 
yingbing [Old Soldiers Never Die: Hong Kong Chinese Servicemen of the British 
Armed Forces] (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2014); and Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi 
Yiu Lun, Eastern Fortress. 
12  David Macri, Clash of Empires in South China: The Allied Nations’ Proxy War 
with Japan, 1935–1941 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012); and Philip 
Cracknell, Battle for Hong Kong. 
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understanding of the battle and clear up some unsettled issues by 
cross-referencing different primary sources has emerged.
the battle of hong kong spatial history project
The Battle of Hong Kong Spatial History Project (hereafter “the 
BoHK Project” or “the Project”), launched in June 2020, aims to 
narrate the battle through visualisation and spatial history.13 The 
Project’s deliverables include an interactive map of the battle and a 
database of its related British military structures. To prepare for the 
BoHK Project, the research team completed a pilot project focusing 
on the history of the British Army Aid Group, an MI9 organisation 
operating in Hong Kong and South China after the fall of Hong Kong. 
The pilot project allowed the research team to familiarise themselves 
with basic SH skills such as georeferencing, dataset preparation and 
related software usage.14
As Richard White suggests, “visualization and spatial history 
… is a means of doing research; it generates questions that might 
otherwise go unasked, revealing historical relations that might 
otherwise go unnoticed, and it undermines, or substantiates, stories 
upon which we build our own versions of the past.”15 The Project 
seeks to examine previous arguments about the battle and attempts 
to identify previously overlooked details and relations. Since the 
inception of geographic information system (GIS) technologies, there 
have been numerous SH works related to military history as it is 
easier to narrate a battle through maps.16 Interactive maps provide 
readers ready access to an overview of a battle, while the author of 
13  Link to the project: https://digital.lib.hkbu.edu.hk/1941hkbattle/en/index.html. 
The project has been supported financially by the Quality Education Fund and 
the research team has received kind support from the Royal British Legion, Hong 
Kong Veteran Commemorative Association, Digital Services of Hong Kong Baptist 
University Library and Knowledge Transfer Office at Hong Kong Baptist University. 
14  “Hong Kong Resistance: the British Army Aid Group, 1942–1945 - A Spatial 
History Project (Scroll Down to Open Map),” accessed 13 February 2021, https://
digital.lib.hkbu.edu.hk/history/baag.php.
15  Richard White, “What is Spatial History?” Spatial History Lab (1 February 2010): 
6, https://web.stanford.edu/group/spatialhistory/media/images/publication/
what%20is%20spatial%20history%20pub%20020110.pdf.
16  The largest scale of these work is Project ‘44, “The Road to Liberation,” accessed 
13 February 2021, https://www.project44.ca/.
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6 Reappraising the Battle of Hong Kong
any textual account must make necessary choices regarding the focus 
of the narrative. In every battle, there are inter-related events that 
occur in various locations, which make them challenging to relate if 
they are being textually narrated. Hence, maps are essential for any 
battle account. Despite the necessity of maps, print maps suffer from 
several limitations: the readers must flip through multiple pages to 
see the changing situation; they may find it difficult to follow the 
events if they are not familiar with the battlefield; if the maps are 
heavily annotated, readers may find them difficult to read; and if the 
maps prioritise clarity over the volume of information, readers may 
not understand the complete picture. 
Military-history-related SH projects, however, also have 
limitations. First, the cost of conducting SH projects can be 
considerable, even with the latest technology. Investigators must learn 
to use related software or relevant computer languages or cooperate 
with GIS and information technology specialists who may not possess 
the relevant historical knowledge. The author of this article, the 
principal investigator of the BoHK Project, has been working with 
a group of graphic design and information technology specialists on 
the user interface and user experience of the interactive map and 
database. Had the author not been supported by a substantial grant 
from public sources, this project could not have been conceived. 
Investigators need to provide the manpower to compile datasets 
based on primary sources. The BoHK Project Team consulted twenty 
British and fourteen Japanese war diaries and other primary sources 
such as memoirs and regimental histories. Secondary sources were 
also included, particularly works by Tony Banham, Philip Cracknell, 
Kwong Chi Man and Rusty Tsoi Yiu Lun. The team then divided the 
eighteen-day battle into fifty “layers,” each representing the situation 
of a particular moment. The intervals between layers vary between 
one day and four to six hours to represent the intensive actions and 
movements that occurred during different phases of the battle.
The Project illustrates the movement of over 160 units and 
subunits from both sides (72 British and Commonwealth units, 
excluding the fixed batteries; 78 Japanese units; and one Chinese 
6
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unit)17 by including them as points of interest (POIs) on the map. The 
source for a unit’s location is usually the unit’s war diaries, supported 
by collaborating sources such as other war diaries and memoirs. The 
POIs are placed at approximately the centre point of the unit’s front, 
but in the context of Hong Kong a unit’s frontage could be as narrow 
as a road’s width, especially during the battle of Hong Kong Island. 
Many of the war diaries on both sides contained detailed records of 
events and geographical information such as map grids. However, for 
some units that lost most of their officers, such as the Indian infantry 
battalions and the Hong Kong Singapore Royal Artillery, the war 
diaries were less clear. These gaps in knowledge are often filled by 
war diaries of higher-level commands such as the Fortress War Diary 
or the East Brigade War Diary, narratives of other units, survivors’ 
personal memoirs and official Japanese records. The first position of 
most British units, unless otherwise stated, is marked according to 
the last version of the Defence Scheme, revised after the arrival of 
the C Force.18
The Japanese war diaries, while more complete than those of 
other groups, contained gaps until the recent discovery of more 
records, regimental histories and maps concerning the battle. The 
38th Division’s account was unclear about individual units’ positions 
during the battle, but this was compensated by the use of the war 
diaries of other units, which have recently been made available. 
Some of these units, such as the 20th Independent Mountain Gun 
Battalion, maintained the original texts of their orders received from 
higher commands. These orders contain temporal and geographical 
information that allow us to pinpoint certain units’ positions 
throughout the battle. Most importantly, the 23rd Army and the 
17  The calculation method here avoids double counting a scattered unit that is 
represented by multiple POIs; for example, the guns of the 965th Defence Battery 
were scattered across Hong Kong Island to defend the beaches. They are counted as 
a single unit here. 
18  This Defence Scheme, based on the Interim Defence Scheme that was updated 
in 1939, was drafted just before the outbreak of the war. It has never been used in 
any studies about the Battle of Hong Kong as it was not purchased from a private 
collector until 2018. The scheme is now part of the collection of the Hong Kong 
Museum of Coastal Defence (MCD). 
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38th Division staff created several comprehensive battle maps that 
show the Japanese units’ disposition before and during the battle.19
The research team also included information about British 
defence structures in the interactive map. There were 12 coastal 
defence gun batteries, 9 anti-aircraft gun batteries, 30 observation 
posts, 11 headquarters and command posts, 32 searchlight positions, 
211 pillboxes and 68 structures such as shelters, magazines, barracks, 
field hospitals and disused batteries. The positions and functions of 
these structures were recorded in 1939 and 1941 Defence Schemes 
and their states in the early 2020s updated through a study of aerial 
photographs and fieldwork. The database enhances our understanding 
of major military structures such as the Gin Drinker’s Line20 and 
reveals the substantial works conducted by the British from the 1930s 
to prepare Hong Kong for an invasion which have often been too 
easily dismissed by various analyses of the battle.21 
To allow the viewers of the interactive map to better understand 
Hong Kong in 1941, the Project team georeferenced several historical 
maps and added them as layers that can be viewed with the POIs. The 
research team benefitted from Historic Maps Hong Kong, a website 
19  These maps reveal that only a small number of troops existed immediately along 
the border days before the war. At that time, Maltby still reported to Singapore and 
London that he could not detect large-scale troop movements in the border area. It 
was not until the evening of 7 December that the troops rapidly approached Hong 
Kong from places such as Po Kat, around ten kilometres from the border. This 
helped to debunk one of the myths surrounding the Battle of Hong Kong; namely, 
that Maltby refused to believe that Japanese troops were situated immediately 
across the front in the days before the battle. 
20  The Gin Drinker’s Line was a defensive line along the Kowloon Ridge that 
separated Kowloon Peninsula from the New Territories. It consisted of around 100 
concrete-built structures, including pillboxes, observation posts, shelters and an 
underground defended locality known as the Shing Mun Redoubt. For a detailed 
discussion about the Line, see Kwong Chi Man, “Reconstructing the Early History of 
the Gin Drinker’s Line from Archival Sources,” Surveying and Built Environment 22, 
1 (2012): 19-36. Largely based on the works of Rob Weir and through the reading of 
aerial photographs and field work, Lawrence Lai has produced a map of the location 
of the pillboxes along the Gin Drinker’s Line. See Lawrence Lai, “The Gin Drinker’s 
Line: Reconstruction of a British Colonial Defence Line in Hong Kong Using Aerial 
Photo Information,” Property Management 27, 1 (2009): 16-41; and Lawrence Lai, 
Stephen N. G. Davis, Ken S. T. Ching and Castor T. C. Wong, “Location of Pillboxes 
and Other Structures of the Gin Drinker’s Line Based on Aerial Photo Evidence,” 
Surveying & Build Environment 21, 2 (December 2011): 69-70.
21  However, field works such as trenches are omitted from the database as records 
about them are incomplete and postwar aerial photographs show trenches built by the 
Japanese after the fall of Hong Kong, making it difficult to determine which are extant.
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dedicated to georeferencing historical maps.22 While historical maps 
are relatively easy to come by, they are not always accurate and no 
existing map accurately shows the whole of Hong Kong in 1941. The 
closest candidate is the 1:20,000 1939 Ordnance Map of Hong Kong, 
photolithographed in 1945 but drawn and heliographed during the 
Ordnance Survey in 1939.23 Based on the 1939 Ordnance Map, the 
Japanese produced several maps when they planned their operations. 
The research team included two of these, one produced in 1939 and 
the other in October 1941, to show how much the Japanese knew 
about the British defences in Hong Kong.24
new observations
planning and operational effectiveness
The research team first compiled a complete order of battle of the 
British and Japanese forces. While the order of battle of the British 
and Commonwealth forces that participated in the battle is well 
known, previous studies have been less clear about the composition 
of the Japanese forces. Maltby recalled that he faced two Japanese 
infantry divisions supported by an assortment of air and naval 
units.25 Some recent works have suggested that as many as three 
divisions attacked Hong Kong.26 The invading Japanese forces, under 
the operational control of the 23rd Army, consisted of the 38th 
Division; the 1st Artillery Brigade/Group; the 14th, 19th and 20th 
22  See Historic Maps Hong Kong, accessed 12 February 2021, http://www.hkmaps.
hk/mapviewer.html. 
23  The next update took place in 1949, which included all the changes since the 
end of the war in 1945. See http://www.hkmaps.hk/mapviewer.html (accessed 12 
February 2021).
24  “Honkon bōgyo shisetsu to [Map of Hong Kong Defences],” 1938, georeferenced 
by Historic Maps Hong Kong, accessed 12 February 2021, http://www.hkmaps.hk/
mapviewer.html; and “Honkon fukin ei kunigun bōbi jōkyō to [Map Showing the 
British Military Defences in Hong Kong],” Nan-shi 35, National Institute for Defence 
Studies, Japan.
25  “Operations in Hong Kong from 8 to 25 December 1941 (Despatch from the 
Supplement to the London Gazette),” London Gazette, 29 January 1948, 703.
26  Lieutenant-Colonel George Trist suggested that Hong Kong was attacked by two 
to five divisions. See Lieutenant-Colonel George Trist, “Report on the Part Played 
by Winnipeg Grenadiers in the Defence of Hong Kong,” Canadian Military History 
10, 4 (2001): 23.
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Engineer Regiments; the 10th Mountain Gun Regiment; the 2nd and 
5th Rapid-firing Gun Battalions; the 20th Mountain Gun Battalion; 
and the 21st Mortar Battalion. The 38th Division had mountain 
gun and engineer regiments (the 38th Mountain Gun Regiment and 
the 38th Engineer Regiment) and the 1st Artillery Brigade/Group 
consisted of one heavy artillery (the 1st) and one heavy field gun 
regiment (the 14th) as well as two heavy field gun regiments (the 
2nd and 3rd) and one heavy mortar battalion (the 12th). In all, the 
Japanese forces had three infantry regiments (the 228th, 229th and 
230th), nine infantry battalions (three battalions in each regiment), 
four engineer regiments, four artillery regiments and seven artillery 
battalions. A mixed brigade (the 66th, around 6,000 men) guarded 
the Hong Kong–China border throughout the battle. As for naval 
forces, the Japanese Second China Fleet deployed one 5,500-ton light 
cruiser, three destroyers, four torpedo boats, three gunboats, several 
auxiliary vessels and five seaplanes. The invading force enjoyed air 
supremacy and was supported by a light bomber wing, a fighter 
squadron and several reconnaissance planes.27
The spatial history approach helps clarify two common 
criticisms against Major General Maltby, who has been accused of 
underestimating the number of Japanese troops across the border and 
overlooking the possibility of a landward invasion. He was noted to 
have told the Canadians that there were only 5,000 Japanese troops 
across the border.28 This claim should be placed in a proper spatial 
and temporal context as Maltby’s claim was technically correct 
before the war’s outbreak. The 38th Division and the artillery units 
that attacked Hong Kong were stationed east of Canton (Guangzhou) 
until the last week of November and did not approach within thirty 
kilometres of the border until December 7.29 Maltby’s intelligence 
branch failed to detect the invading force because the Japanese 
launched a feint attack on Guangxi; thus, the British only detected 
a sizeable Japanese force across the border on 6 December.30 Maltby 
wrote to his wife on 30 November: “I do not think this state of 
27  Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, Eastern Fortress, 167-71.
28  Trist, “Report on the Part Played by Winnipeg Grenadiers in the Defence of Hong 
Kong,” 22. 
29  “Honkon kōryakusen sentō keika yōzu [Map of the Battle of Hong Kong],” January 
1942, Ref: C13031840200, Japan Centre for Asian Historical Records (JACAR).
30  “Fortress War Diary,” Appendix B1, 1, WO (War Office Records) 106/2401A, The 
National Archives, United Kingdom (TNA). 
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tension can last much longer. It will either be a showdown or Japan 
will have to pipe down. I am as set here as I can be without putting 
everyone out their manning positions and that can be done in a very 
short time.”31 As early as 30 November, the Mainland Brigade was 
deployed along the Gin Drinker’s Line.32
This project allows us to appreciate the interconnectedness of 
the land, naval and air dimensions of the battle. Contrary to claims 
made after the war, the garrison prepared for the invasion as far as 
manpower and resources allowed.33 Previous studies on the battle 
focused on actions on land. The BoHK Project, however, highlights 
the combined nature of the British defence planning and the role of 
the services and branches. The Project team also benefitted from 
reading the recently discovered last edition of the Defence Scheme, 
revised in November 1941 when the two Canadian battalions arrived 
in Hong Kong. According to the Defence Scheme, the garrison was 
to “deny the anchorage to the enemy” and “maintain a footing in 
the colony.”34 The garrison had to hold Hong Kong Island as long as 
possible to achieve these goals. The plan stated that an invasion from 
the New Territories, a direct attack on Hong Kong Island, a landing 
in the area south of the Gin Drinker’s Line and combinations of all 
these methods were possible.35
Instead of merely a land-focused plan, the British possessed a 
combined scheme that tried to integrate all assets available to the 
garrison. The garrison attempted to use firepower and permanent 
defences to prolong its resistance and compensate for the lack of 
manpower. The British used coastal artillery (Fig. 1) to provide long-
range fire support for the troops along the Gin Drinker’s Line, which 
spanned across the Kowloon Ridge that overlooked the north shore of 
Hong Kong Island. The garrison prepared fire plans for the emergency 
shelling of certain positions where the Japanese forces were expected 
to pass. To make the plan work, the British constructed a system of 
fire command that used fixed telephone lines to connect the artillery 
commands (divided into East and West Fire Command), the fixed and 
prepared mobile artillery positions and observation posts. Preparing 
31  “Hong Kong, 30 November 1941,” in C. M. Maltby Scrapbook, Document 22835, 
Imperial War Museum Collection (IWM).
32  “A Brief Resume of Events from December 1941 Onwards,” 1, Document 3671, IWM.
33  Copp, “The Defence of Hong Kong,” 7. 
34  “Hong Kong Interim Defence Scheme, 1941,” Part I, 1, MCD.
35  “Hong Kong Interim Defence Scheme, 1941”, Part I, 1, MCD.
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Figure 1: Disposition of the British and Commonwealth garrison on 8 December 1941; the blue POIs show the Gin Drinker’s Line and the Coast Defence 
Batteries on Hong Kong Island and Stonecutters Island. [All images in this article are screenshots courtesy of the Battle of Hong Kong Spatial History Project]
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this elaborate communication system took more than a year.36 A 1938 
combined exercise report suggested that the garrison should be “linked 
up like a battleship.”37 As the garrison had no air cover, it had to rely 
on anti-aircraft guns on Hong Kong Island to protect the coastal 
defence guns and other defences, ground troops and naval vessels. 
Although the Royal Navy only had one destroyer, two usable gunboats 
and six motor torpedo boats throughout the battle, it augmented the 
garrison’s firepower in locations where the coastal guns could not 
bear effectively, such as the coastline of Castle Peak Bay north of 
Stonecutters Island. In addition, the navy played a role in assisting the 
withdrawal of the garrison from Kowloon and, from at least 1940, the 
Royal Navy jointly exercised with the ground troops.
Maltby ordered three battalions to fight a delaying action on the 
mainland to buy time for the garrison to prepare for the siege of the 
Island and he expected to hold the Gin Drinker’s Line for around 
seven days.38 His Japanese counterparts made similar estimations.39 
Maltby stated his intention in the 1941 Defence Scheme: “the role… [of 
the troops on the mainland] is that of a rear-guard. Their task is the 
very difficult one to inflict the maximum loss and delay on an enemy 
advance with the minimum loss to themselves. It must be assumed 
that the enemy will be using his best troops, will be advancing in 
considerable force, and will be ‘all-out’ to reach Kowloon as quickly as 
possible.”40 Had he sent more troops to the mainland, Maltby might 
lose more troops there and had fewer troops for the defence of the 
Island. Had he sent fewer troops, the fall of Kowloon might have been 
too quick to allow the garrison to move vital supplies to the Island. 
An attempt to engage in street-to-street fighting in Kowloon might 
entrap the British troops there and cause numerous civilian losses. As 
for his plan for the Island, Maltby has been accused of scattering his 
assets.41 However, an overview of the battlefield justifies his concern, 
as Maltby lacked the means to protect the long shoreline of Hong 
Kong Island and detect incoming attacks. Moreover, although a thrust 
from the north was the most likely, Maltby could not concentrate his 
36  Eustace Levett, “And then—the Soldier,” in Private Papers of Lieutenant Colonel 
E O Levett OBE, 156–64, Document 26105, IWM.
37  “Report on Combined Operations: Hong Kong,” 13, March 1938, WO 196/9, TNA.
38  “Operations in Hong Kong from 8 to 25 December 1941,” 700.
39  Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, Eastern Fortress, 169. 
40  “Hong Kong Interim Defence Scheme, 1941,” Part VI, Section C, 1, MCD.
41  Copp, “The Defence of Hong Kong,” 10. 
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troops on the northern shore. The Japanese artillery could decimate 
those troops before landing operations, as Japanese guns could easily 
reach the north shore of the Island and the northward slope behind it. 
Thus, Maltby had fewer options than is generally assumed. Fortunate 
for Maltby, the poor coordination of the Japanese army and navy 
spared him from facing an attack from both the north and south sides 
of the Island. 
To protect outnumbered troops from shelling and air attacks, 
the British built numerous concrete pillboxes, shelters and storage 
facilities in Kowloon and on Hong Kong Island. The idea of building 
a static defence line was first proposed in 1930, which led to the 
construction of the “Gin Drinker’s Line.” The line was intended to be 
the “inner line” of a three-layered defensive zone covering the New 
Territories, but the other two layers never materialised.42 Although 
further work on the Gin Drinker’s Line was stopped in July 1938, 
more defensive structures were later built on Hong Kong Island. The 
most significant of these works include the concentration of all coastal 
batteries and anti-aircraft guns on the Island and the modernisation 
of coastal batteries such as Mount Davis Fortress.43 The British built 
seventy-one44 splinter-proof45 pillboxes on Hong Kong Island, most 
of which were located along the shoreline, supported by Lyon Lights 
for beach defence. They also built eighteen “Locality Pillboxes” in 
mountain valleys on the Island, including the three pillboxes in Wong 
Nai Chung Gap which inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese forces. 
These localities aimed to provide strong points that would delay the 
Japanese advance and deny them the heights. The garrison also built 
two fortress plotting rooms in Mount Davis and Tai Tam as command 
centres for the Fire Commands. Shelters were built near pre-arranged 
defended localities and mobile artillery positions south of the Kowloon 
Ridge and the Island, providing concrete accommodations and storage 
facilities (Fig 2).
42  Kwong Chi Man, “Reconstructing the Early History of the Gin Drinker’s Line 
from Archival Sources,” Surveying and Built Environment 22, 1 (2012): 19–36.
43  Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, Eastern Fortress, 107–15. 
44  The Defence Scheme recorded seventy-two pillboxes but one of them, PB 45, 
was possibly only a machine gun emplacement rather than a complete pillbox. The 
author thanks Tony Banham and Rob Weir for this information. 
45  These splinter proof pillboxes had concrete walls that were 30–70 mm thick and 
could not withstand direct hit from field guns. “Hong Kong Interim Defence Scheme, 
1941,” Part I, 1, MCD.
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In short, one should not easily dismiss the garrison’s effort in 
using static defences to compensate for the shortage in manpower 
as a reflection of the garrison commanders’ “First World War 
mentality.” The garrison’s senior commanders, such as Maltby 
and his Chief of Staff Colonel Lance Newnham, were aware of the 
garrison’s “Maginot-mindedness” and the problem of covering a large 
area that consisted of a complex shoreline and rugged terrain with 
four (later six) battalions.46 The Defence Scheme also warned the 
troops manning the Gin Drinker’s Line to not rely on fixed lines 
and pillboxes.47 Soon after he arrived in Hong Kong, Maltby raised 
a local machine gun battalion to man the pillboxes on Hong Kong 
Island so that the Middlesex Battalion, an infantry unit that was 
converted into a machine gun battalion after Maltby arrived in Hong 
Kong, could be freed as a general reserve for mobile operations and 
46  “A Volunteer Remembers,” unpublished memoir of Colonel Harry Owen-Hughes, 
Bundle III, 8, Elizabeth Ride Collection, Hong Kong University Library.
47  “Hong Kong Interim Defence Scheme, 1941,” Part III, Section K, 13, MCD. 
Figure 2: Pillboxes and concrete shelters on Hong Kong Island.
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local counterattacks.48 However, when the Japanese forces attacked, 
the local battalion, known as the Hong Kong Chinese Regiment, 
had only a nucleus strength of fifty-six men. With the arrival of 
the Canadian brigade, the garrison tried to update the defence 
scheme while considering the additional transport. To add further 
complication, the garrison’s mobility was critically limited by the 
lack of wireless radio, a fact that forced much of the garrison to rely 
on static structures that had pre-arranged means of communication. 
In contrast, the Japanese forces, which had more manpower and 
resources, performed poorly in operational planning and execution. 
One of the most widely circulated myths about the battle was 
that the Japanese had very detailed knowledge about Hong Kong’s 
defences before the battle. Historians have suggested that Japanese 
spies penetrated various parts of the Hong Kong civil establishment 
and had given Tokyo the most updated British plans and the location 
of British defences. This claim has not been supported by much 
evidence. On the one hand, the Japanese forces had a general picture 
of the static defences of the garrison as shown by the map prepared 
by the staff of the 23rd Army.49 Although the map gave the planners 
a general idea of Hong Kong’s defences, it presented numerous 
inaccuracies. For example, while the map showed the major batteries 
on Hong Kong Island, the two decommissioned coastal batteries on 
the Kowloon side—Gough and Pottinger batteries, which were listed 
as being equipped with 9-inch guns—and some of the pillboxes along 
the Gin Drinker’s Line, including the Shing Mun Redoubt, the map 
failed to locate most of the pillboxes, especially the locality pillboxes. 
Worse, the above information was not shared with the Imperial 
Japanese Navy (IJN) which carried out its reconnaissance missions 
in mid-November. The IJN search planes could not even locate the 
coastal defence guns on the southern side of Hong Kong Island.50
While many accounts illustrate the solid combat effectiveness of 
the Japanese soldiers and some of the junior officers, especially during 
night engagements, the Japanese forces that attacked Hong Kong were 
poorly handled at the operational level. Spatial history helps us to 
48  “GOC Hong Kong to WO,” 8 August 1941, WO 208/725, TNA.
49  “Honkon fukin ei kunigun bōbi jōkyō to [Map Showing the British Military 
Defences in Hong Kong],” Nan-shi 35, National Institute for Defence Studies, Japan.
50  “Dai san kōkūtai sentō shōhō dai sangō [War Diary of 3rd Squadron, No. 3],” 
January 1942, Ref: C14120704000, JACAR.
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understand this problem by showing the Japanese forces’ deployment 
during different stages of the battle. The Japanese advance into the 
New Territories started with an imagined encirclement of non-existent 
enemy positions along the border (Fig 3). The Japanese staff then 
planned a daytime frontal offensive along the Gin Drinker’s Line, 
evenly distributing the infantry battalions along the front. Only the 
victory at Shing Mun Redoubt, much to the surprise of the Japanese 
commanders, allowed the Japanese to quickly overcome the British 
right flank. The commander of the 230th Infantry Regiment (230i)51 
then launched a costly frontal morning assault against Golden Hill 
(Fig 4). After that, the Japanese forces grew overcautious and failed 
to catch the retreating Mainland Brigade (Fig 5), which crossed 
Victoria Harbour. 
Compared to their plan for the New Territories and Kowloon, the 
Japanese plan for Hong Kong Island was flimsy at best. Again, the 
Japanese commanders planned a general advance along a broad front 
with troops evenly distributed between the regimental boundaries. 
Communication between regiments was almost non-existent until 
days after landing. Cooperation between the ground troops and naval 
forces did not exist and no attempts were made to feint a southward 
51  The short form of a Japanese infantry regiment such as “230i” follows the Japanese 
practice and is consistent with the maps attached to Japanese records.  
Figure 3: Japanese and British troops along the border in the morning of 8 December 1941.
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Figure 4: British and Japanese troops in Kowloon after the fall of Shing Mun Redoubt, 10 December 1941.
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Figure 5: British withdrawal from Kowloon, 11-13 December 1941.
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invasion to tie down the British troops, which freely moved toward 
the northeastern and eastern parts of the Island. When 230i was in 
Wong Nai Chung Gap, other Japanese battalions lined up in Stanley 
Gap for a day without trying to exploit the situation either north 
or south of the Wong Nai Chung Gap (Fig 6). The Japanese troops 
in the Gap launched repeated frontal assaults that led to hundreds 
of casualties. They captured various positions mainly through sheer 
numbers, as the Japanese commanders had yet to decide to move 
their artillery to the Island. When the East Brigade’s presence at 
Stanley was detected due to its counterattack on 20 December, the 
Japanese commander hastily gathered almost all his troops that were 
not engaged and sent them there. Although the East Brigade could 
have been blockaded with fewer troops because it faced unfavourable 
terrain and lacked artillery (Fig 7), the result was carnage in Stanley 
on 24 and 25 December and heavy losses on both sides because 
the Japanese commander insisted on sending a large force to attack 
the East Brigade with little strategic gain. In all, the Japanese 
commanders were unimaginative, although they adapted to the 
situation before total disaster struck thanks to a competent group of 
staff officers who quickly grasped the situation.52
There is no evidence showing that the 23rd Army and the Second 
China Fleet had any in-depth discussion over operational cooperation, 
although an IJN representative was stationed at the headquarters 
of the 23rd Army throughout the battle. During the invasion, the 
Second China Fleet could not assist in operations as the coastal guns 
in Hong Kong prevented its major units from approaching the Island. 
The IJN Marines only participated in the landing of the evacuated 
Tsing Yi Island on 12 December, where two anti-aircraft searchlight 
positions existed. The IJN heavy bombers, which attacked Hong 
Kong on 16 December, focused on the Royal Naval Dockyard at 
Aberdeen rather than the coastal guns that prevented the naval 
vessels from supporting the ground operations. Early destruction of 
the Stanley guns would have allowed the Japanese to capture the 
52  Four out of six staff officers of the Fortress Headquarters were killed while trying 
to ascertain the situation at the front. Oliver Lindsay, The Lasting Honour: The 
Fall of Hong Kong 1941 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), 127. For an example 
of the Japanese staff officers’ work at the front, see “Dai sanhachi shidan honkon 
kōryakusen sentō shōhō [War Diary of the 38th Division: the Battle of Hong Kong],” 
Chapter VI, 228 (slide 24), Ref: C13031768600, JACAR. The British faced a similar 
problem with different results. 
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Figure 6: Japanese troops congregated at Wong Nai Chung Gap and Stanley Gap, instead of approaching the City of Victoria from different sides.
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Figure 7: The East Brigade’s failed counterattack on 20 December.
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Stanley Peninsula with their marines long before the East Brigade 
could barricade itself in the Peninsula. The IJA air force made the 
same mistake of not trying to attack the coastal batteries on the 
southern side of the Island except for once on the 18th.53 Thus, the 
IJN could not exert any pressure on the garrison from the south. 
Similarly, after the capture of Kowloon, the IJA artillery did not 
prioritise reducing the garrison’s anti-aircraft firepower so that the 
air elements could play a greater role, although the Pinewood Anti-
Aircraft Battery was destroyed because of its exposed position.54
the role and impact of the canadian forces 
While the outline of the battle is well known, gaps still exist in the 
narrative, especially concerning the role and performance of C Force. 
The SH approach allows us to appreciate C Force’s experience better 
as it reveals the interaction between the British, Commonwealth 
and Japanese forces and shows the impact of specific actions on the 
flow of events. First, it is difficult to connect and analyse multiple 
interrelated events in separate spaces in textual narratives. Second, 
first-hand accounts may describe the same event differently and 
omit the linkage between events. Of the various units that had 
participated in the battle, the Canadian troops’ experience was the 
most confusing because of several factors. First, the two Canadian 
battalions, the Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers, 
were new to Hong Kong and the officers and men were still 
familiarising themselves with the ground when the invasion began. 
The two battalions were allotted to different brigades and, although 
one of them was under the direct control of C Force Commander 
Brigadier-General John Lawson, he and his staff were killed during 
the battle. To make matters worse, the commander of the Winnipeg 
Grenadiers, Colonel John Sutcliffe, died during captivity.55 Thus, 
the account of the Winnipeg Grenadiers is less clear than other 
53  “War Diary and Narrative of East Infantry Brigade,” in Brigadier C. R. Templer, 
20, Document 40186, IWM.
54  “Dai sanhachi shidan honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō [War Diary of the 
38th Division: the Battle of Hong Kong],” Chapter VI, 181-82 (slides 1–2), Ref: 
C13031768600, JACAR.
55  Trist, “Report on the Part Played by Winnipeg Grenadiers in the Defence of Hong 
Kong,” 21–26. 
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battalions, with the possible exception of the Punjab Battalion, 
which had also lost its commanding officer and many other officers. 
The chain of command of the Royal Rifles remained relatively intact 
throughout the battle and it produced a more detailed account of 
its actions. Further information can be drawn from the account 
Brigadier Cedric Wallis, left of the actions of the East Brigade. While 
both accounts contained some errors, they can be cross-checked with 
other accounts, such as that of Captain Peter Belton who served as 
a staff officer of the East Brigade, and the Japanese records.56
The C Force witnessed almost every stage of the battle of Hong 
Kong at the forefront, except during the opening skirmishes along the 
border. During the battle for Kowloon, D Company of the Winnipeg 
Grenadiers (D/WG) was sent to Kwai Chung on the evening of 10 
December to shore up the crumbling line of the Royal Scots, who 
were facing attack from three Japanese battalions (II/230i, III/230i 
and III/228i) with ample artillery support (37-mm quick-firing guns 
and 75-mm mountain guns). By mid-day of 11 December, the Royal 
Scots withdrew to the Golden Hill–Kwai Chung line after losing two 
company commanders (B and C companies). By then, the Japanese 
forces had breached the left-wing of the Gin Drinker’s Line, which 
only had a depth of approximately 1.5 km. In this context, D/WG 
could do little but hold a position near Lai Chi Kok and then withdraw 
with the rest of the garrison to Hong Kong Island later that day. At 
the same time, the Indian troops (mainly from the Rajput Battalion 
and a battery of the Hong Kong Singapore Royal Artillery) fought 
a rear-guard action first near Tseng Lan Shue (Chin Lan Chu) and 
then at Devil’s Peak Peninsula (Fig. 8).
During the battle for Hong Kong Island from 18 to 25 December 
1941, C Force witnessed heavy but very confusing fighting in Sai 
Wan, Mount Parker, Mount Butler, Tai Tam, Wong Nai Chung Gap, 
Stanley and Aberdeen. At around 20:30 hrs on 18 December, four 
and a half battalions of 228i and 230i landed at Tai Koo and North 
Point, overwhelming the Rajput defences. Meanwhile, the II/229i 
and III/229i landed at Lyemun and Aldrich Bay after crossing the 
500 metre-wide Lyemun Channel from Yau Tong. While previous 
accounts focused on the confusion and hinted at the garrison’s lack 
of response, both the East and West Brigades sent mobile columns 
to the northeast sector of the Island, which largely accorded with 
56  “A Brief Resume of Events from December 1941 Onwards,” Document 3671, IWM.
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Figure 8: British rear-
guard action on Devil’s 
Peak Peninsula.
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the Defence Scheme. A mobile platoon from the Middlesex Battalion 
was sent to North Point, where it was ambushed near the North 
Point Power Station. The Headquarters (HQ) Company of Winnipeg 
Grenadiers also sent three platoon-sized mobile columns to Mount 
Butler via the Stanley Gap.57 One platoon (5th58) of Royal Rifles 
was sent to the summit of Mount Parker, with two platoons (the 9th 
and 12th) reinforcing Boa Vista, a height between Mount Parker 
and Gauge Basin (near Tai Tam Reservoir). The purpose of these 
moves was to shore up the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps 
(HKVDC) positions on the hills—Jardine’s Lookout, Mount Butler 
and Mount Parker—and prevent further penetration by the Japanese 
forces. A Company of Winnipeg Grenadiers (A/WG) later joined the 
HQ platoons moving toward Mount Butler. 
However, with a numerical superiority of ten to one, the Japanese 
forces quickly overran the Rajputs and within hours had gained a 
foothold. At around 22:00 hrs, 229i had already taken Sau Ki Wan 
and Lyemun Redoubt (installed only with dummy guns) and was 
pushing toward Sai Wan Fort (which was converted into an anti-
aircraft battery with three 3-inch anti-aircraft guns), capturing the 
position soon afterward.59 The East Group Royal Artillery account 
alleges that troops from C Company of the Royal Rifles (C/RR) 
failed to launch a counterattack to recapture Sai Wan Fort.60 The 
Canadian report states that the troops attempting to approach the 
fort from the west were held up by a “perpendicular twenty-foot brick 
wall.” 61 Georeferenced aerial photographs clearly show the wall in 
question (Fig. 9). The approach from the north was also impossible, 
as fire from the Lyemun Barracks could easily block the northern 
entrance to Sai Wan Fort. 
57  As Lieutenant-Colonel Sutcliffe was at the Fortress Headquarters, the decision to 
send in the mobile columns seems to be one of the earliest reactions of the Fortress 
Headquarters toward the Japanese landing. Trist, “Report on the Part Played by 
Winnipeg Grenadiers in the Defence of Hong Kong,” 21. 
58  With two sections from 2nd Platoon. See “Canadian Participation in the Defence 
of Hong Kong,” 34, November 1946, CAB 44/316, TNA.
59  Later, the unit killed twenty-eight gunners from the 5th Anti-Aircraft Battery, 
HKVDC and 5th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Royal Artillery. The same night, 
229i troops slaughtered the British, Canadian and Hong Kong medical personnel of 
the First Aid Post at Salesian Mission near Sau Ki Wan. 
60  “Royal Artillery Report on Operations in Hong Kong in December 1941,” 11, WO 
172/1687, TNA.
61  “Canadian Participation in the Defence of Hong Kong,” 33. 
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C/RR then withdrew with the gunners and formed a position 
southwest of Sai Wan Fort, holding the southern end of Chai Wan 
Gap. As the defenders were strengthening the Chai Wan Gap 
position, the two battalions of 229i, with around 1,200 men, did 
not press on along the Island Road and instead moved west, with 
a company advancing toward the summit of Mount Parker. They 
followed their original plan to form a north–south line along Wong 
Nai Chung Gap. The 229i was allotted to the southernmost position 
of that line and those troops took Mount Parker at 08:00 hrs on 19 
December, decimating the 5th Platoon RR there, and pushed on 
toward Mount Butler.62 It then continued west toward Stanley Gap, 
leaving only one company holding Boa Vista, which the East Brigade 
gave up at around noon. To the left of 229i, 228i reached Quarry 
Pass after a night of confused fighting against the Rajputs. It also 
turned west toward Stanley Gap ahead of 229i, spreading out along 
the north–south line between Mount Butler and Tai Tam Reservoir 
and clashing headlong with two Winnipeg flying columns and then 
A/WG. Thus, between around 08:00 and 11:00 hrs on 19 December, 
A Company and two platoons from HQ Company of the Winnipeg 
Grenadiers near Mount Butler (a front of approximately 900 metres) 
encountered two battalions (I/228i and II/228i), of which at least five 
companies were deployed to face the Canadian troops (Fig. 10).63
While A/WG and the flying columns struggled near Mount 
Butler, the II/230i and III/230i with two more companies from the 
I/230i moved south from North Point to reach Wong Nai Chung Gap 
through Sir Cecil’s Ride around Jardine’s Lookout, passing through 
D/WG’s position and the West Brigade Headquarters to its west. 
As D/WG was below the Ride and the Japanese troops approached 
hours after A/WG and the flying columns passed through the area, 
no contact was made, although the Royal Scots holding Stubbs Road 
spotted the Japanese troops. The vanguard of this group of Japanese 
troops was eventually spotted in the early morning of 19 December 
near Wong Nai Chung Gap Reservoir and a confusing battle ensued. 
The HKVDC, holding pillboxes near the southern end of Sir Cecil’s 
62  “Canadian Participation in the Defence of Hong Kong,” 34; and Hohei dai ninikyū 
rentaishi hensan īnkai, Hohei dai ninikyū rentaishi (Nagoya: Fukufukukai, 1981), 305–
06. During the engagement, the commanding officer of the 12th Company was killed.
63  “Canadian Participation in the Defence of Hong Kong,” 43–44; and Hohei 
ninihachi rentaishi kankōkai, Hohei ninihachi rentaishi (Tokyo: Hohei ninihachi 
rentaishi kankōkai, 1974), 88.
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Figure 10: Fighting near Mount Butler, 19 December 1941.
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Ride, inflicted many casualties on 230i. British reinforcements rushed 
in throughout the day, but they lacked coordination.64 The 230i, 
despite heavy losses, captured the Police Station at the southern end 
of Wong Nai Chung Gap but failed to go up Mount Nicholson to its 
west. Lawson was killed when he attempted to evacuate the West 
Brigade Headquarters in the morning. The Japanese could not push 
further in this direction due to heavy losses plus the resistance of 
D/WG, the HKVDC and the reinforcements from various units. In 
particular, D/WG prevented the Japanese troops from moving north 
into Happy Valley via Blue Pool Road as it held the shelters near 
the northern end of Wong Nai Chung Gap, thus protecting the flank 
of the Blue Pool Road–Leighton Hill position that was manned by 
Indian (from both the Rajput and Punjab Battalions) and Middlesex 
troops (Fig. 11).65 Not until the afternoon of 22 December did the 
Japanese overcome the resistance of D/WG and work their way 
north from Happy Valley toward Leighton Hill, the Racecourse and 
Morrison Hill.
After the initial actions, the East Brigade left a covering force at 
Gauge Basin and withdrew toward Stanley to reorganise. The British 
made several mistakes that rendered subsequent counterattacks 
impossible. The East Brigade lost all its artillery, save one 3.7-inch 
howitzer, during the retreat. Without artillery support, the East 
Brigade had to launch repeated frontal assaults from both sides 
of Stanley Peninsula against the Japanese who were holding the 
height. Second, the East Brigade lost Gauge Basin, the gateway 
toward Stanley Gap and Tai Tam Gap, which was not under heavy 
pressure at that time because of a communication error involving 
No. 1 Company of the HKVDC, the artillery units nearby and 
the East Brigade Headquarters (Fig. 12).66 On the morning of 20 
December, the East Brigade launched a counterattack toward the 
Gap, led by A/RR. The attackers received only minimal artillery 
support, a single 18-pounder from the stores and two 6-inch guns of 
the Bluff Head Battery, as the coastal guns at Stanley and Chung 
Hom Kok could not bear and the West Brigade’s guns were not in 
64  Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, Eastern Fortress 197–211; Banham, Not the 
Slightest Chance 117–99; and Cracknell, Battle for Hong Kong 184–96. 
65  “Canadian Participation in the Defence of Hong Kong,” 44–47.
66  “No. 1 Coy, HKVDC War Diary,” 13, WO 172/1693, TNA.
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Figure 11: D/Winnipeg Grenadiers at Wong Nai Chung Gap, 20 December 1941.
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Figure 12: Situation at Tai Tam and Stanley Gap, noon 19 December 1941.
32
Canadian Military History, Vol. 30 [2021], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol30/iss2/1
  33K W O N G
communication with the East Brigade.67 The attacking troops were 
almost immediately held up by Japanese troops from the II/229i and 
III/229i at Middle Spur. After taking Mount Parker on 19 December, 
these two battalions moved along Stanley Gap and turned south at 
Wong Nai Chung Gap Reservoir along the catchwater, taking the 
unguarded Violet Hill and Middle Spur at night. 
As the attack stalled in the afternoon, D/RR was ordered to 
move northeast toward Stanley Gap from the eastern slope of Violet 
Hill via Repulse Bay Gap. After moving across rugged terrain, the 
company, accompanied by a staff officer from the East Brigade, met 
the Japanese 20th Independent Mountain Gun Battalion near Tai 
Tam Byewash Reservoir. There were no other Japanese units in the 
vicinity, except for the single 229i company at Boa Vista and troops 
near Stanley Gap. Another column of the same battalion met the 
HKVDC Bren Carriers at Tai Tam Tuk. On these occasions, both 
sides briefly exchanged fire and withdrew and the Japanese suffered 
a dozen casualties (Fig. 13).68 The counterattack on 20 December 
persuaded the Japanese commander that it was necessary to destroy 
the British forces in Stanley as they threatened his flank and rear via 
Island Road. To this end, the Japanese deployed their reserve (I/229i) 
to Stanley.69 At North Point, the unit was able to move west toward 
Causeway Bay against the Leighton Hill position or, if the Japanese 
wanted to avoid street fighting in Causeway Bay, exploit the joint 
between the Indian troops and the Middlesex Battalion from Caroline 
Hill. The decision to send the battalion to Stanley had implications 
for the rest of the battle, as it considerably slowed down the Japanese 
advance toward Victoria City and prolonged the garrison’s resistance. 
The Japanese could have left a much smaller containing force at 
Middle Spur, Violet Hill, Gauge Basin and Boa Vista that could have 
67  “War Diary and Narrative of East Infantry Brigade,” 44, Document 40186, IWM.
68  “Dokuritsu sanpōhei dai niju daitai honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō [War Diary 
of 20th Independent Mountain Gun Battalion: the Battle of Hong Kong],” Part VI, 
126–27 (slide 16–17), 1942, Ref: C13031798700, JACAR; “Canadian Participation 
in the Defence of Hong Kong,” 36; “A Brief Resume of Events from December 1941 
Onwards,” 8, Document 3671, IWM; “War Diary and Narrative of East Infantry 
Brigade,” 44, Document 40186, IWM; and “The Royal Rifles of Canada, Hong Kong 
War Diary 1st December to 25th December 1941,” 30–31, Hong Kong Veterans 
Commemorative Association, accessed 7 March 2021, https://www.hkvca.ca/
historical/RRC-War%20Diary.pdf.
69  “Dai sanhachi shidan honkon kōryakusen sentō shōhō [War Diary of the 38th 
Division: the Battle of Hong Kong],” Chapter VI, 220, Ref: C13031768600, JACAR.
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Figure 13: Counterattack of D/Royal Rifles, afternoon of 20 December 1941.
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effectively bottled the East Brigade up at Stanley as the latter had 
no artillery support. Because of the East Brigade’s counterattacks 
on 20 December, the Japanese commander directed some of his final 
reserves—two companies of I/230i—to Stanley later that day, which 
arrived at the front in the afternoon the next day (Fig. 14). Thus, 
the East Brigade’s counterattacks, spearheaded on most occasions 
by the Royal Rifles, helped to tie down around six to eight infantry 
companies (out of a total of thirty-six) of the Japanese forces and 
eventually drew the Japanese commanders to launch a regimental-
sized offensive toward Stanley Peninsula that contributed little to 
the outcome of the battle. In the meantime, as mentioned above, 
the Winnipeg Grenadiers endured heavy bombardment on Mount 
Cameron and in the Aberdeen area, especially after the Japanese had 
deployed their field guns to the Island. 
C Force did what it could despite the exceedingly difficult 
circumstances. Without Bren Carriers, trucks, mortars and most 
importantly adequate artillery support, the two Canadian battalions 
lacked the necessary equipment that might have enabled them to fight 
the battle they sought to fight. In most cases, the Canadian troops 
faced an enemy force that was vastly superior in numbers. They were 
sometimes asked to launch frontal assaults against an enemy holding 
the high ground with little to no artillery support. They had no air 
cover and the anti-aircraft gun positions were captured or knocked 
out. They faced heavy artillery bombardment, especially when the 
Japanese forces brought in their guns from Kowloon.70 Although the 
Canadian troops were sometimes blamed for the defeat, it is unlikely 
that other units of the Hong Kong garrison could have done better.
conclusion
A study of the Battle of Hong Kong from the spatial history 
perspective shows the potential of using this approach to clarify 
events and offer new insights concerning various aspects of the 
battle. While the Hong Kong garrison faced heavy odds, the full 
extent of the situation cannot be understood until the assets of both 
70   Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, Eastern Fortress, 164-67, 204-20. See also the 
“1941 Battle of Hong Kong Spatial History Project” map, https://digital.lib.hkbu.
edu.hk/1941hkbattle/en/index.html.
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Figure 14: The East Brigade’s Counterattack near Red Hill on 21 December..
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sides are sorted out and examined spatially. This spatial history 
project reveals the poor planning and execution of the Japanese 
forces and the lack of cooperation between its branches. A review of 
the British planning based on the 1941 Defence Scheme reveals the 
British garrison’s attempt to maximise its effectiveness with limited 
resources to face an enemy force that possessed superior numbers 
and firepower. It also shows the garrison’s crucial deficiencies; 
namely, the reliance on static lines of communication, lack of reliable 
transport and the inability to coordinate its many scattered units. In 
addition, the Project clarifies C Force’s experience during the battle 
and the impact of its actions. The Canadian infantry battalions were 
assigned tasks that they were ill-equipped to handle. Although the 
same was true for the entire garrison, C Force was asked to fight a 
mobile defensive battle against a much larger enemy force containing 
ample artillery and air support. The Japanese forces suffered heavy 
losses only because of the garrison’s determined resistance and the 
Japanese failures in planning and execution throughout the battle.71
The BoHK Project helps researchers obtain new insights and 
is also a useful educational tool. The interactive map it produced 
facilitates a quick understanding of the flow of the battle, relevant 
localities and events. It also helps the commemorative effort by offering 
a space to exhibit the participants’ diverse historical experiences and 
a tool to tell the story with audio and visual sources. Furthermore, 
it assists in the conservation of the military structures in Hong 
Kong that still exist but are in declining condition. Educating the 
public about the historical context and the sites’ importance can 
better protect them from vandalism.72 With adequate resources, the 
BoHK Project could also include features such as three-dimensional 
mapping or even evolve into a mobile application. The Project is an 
ongoing process that allows future updates based on new materials 
and evidence contributed by interested parties worldwide.
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
71  In all, the Japanese lost 136 officers and 2,082 other ranks (killed, wounded or 
missing) while the British lost 3,445 (killed, wounded or missing). It is worth noting 
that the three Japanese regiments lost around 30 per cent of their officers during the 
battle. Kwong Chi Man and Tsoi Yiu Lun, Eastern Fortress, 222. 
72  “French Int’l School offers to clean graffiti from nearby WWII battle site,” Hong 
Kong Free Press, 23 March 2017, https://hongkongfp.com/2017/03/23/french-intl-
school-offers-to-clean-graffiti-from-nearby-wwii-battle-site/.
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